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COUNTIES: Iowa Constitution art. III,§§ 30 and 39A; Iowa Code§§ 331.301; 1848 Iowa 
Acts, 1st G.A., extra session, ch. 52. Lee County, under County Home Rule powers granted 
under Iowa Constitution art. III, sec. 39A, may eliminate one of its county seats designated by 
the special law contained in 1848 Iowa Acts, 1st G.A., extra session, ch. 52, requiring district 
court be held in two cities in Lee County provided such action does not seek to close the district 
court, clerk of court's office or discontinue sheriff's services to these courts in either city. 
(Thompson & Bennett to Taylor, 1-16-15) #15-1-1 
The Honorable Rich Taylor · 
State Senator 
LOCAL 
Dear Senator Taylor: 
You have requested an opinion from this office whether current Iowa law would permit 
the Lee County Board of Supervisors to eliminate one of the two county seats in that county .1 It 
is our determination that action by Lee County to designate a single county seat by ordinance 
would be permitted under County Home Rule as long as such action does not close or move the 
district court and clerks of court offices maintained in Fort Madison and Keokuk or discontinue 
sheriff's services to both courts at these cities. 
County Seat under Iowa Law 
County seat, as defined in Way v. Fox, 109 Iowa 340, 80 N.W. 405 (1899), is the place 
properly designated for doing the business of the county, where public buildings are to be 
erected, where the courts are held, and where county offices are located. This is consistent with 
the following description of the purpose of county seat made during debate on Article III, 
Section 30 of the Iowa Constitution during the 1857 Constitutional Convention: 
Every county must have a point, a public place in which to transact county 
business, hold their courts, have their public offices, keep their records, 
receive their taxes, &c. 
Comments by J. C. Hall, Debates of the 1857 Iowa Constitutional Convention, Vol. I, p. 536. 
See also 56 Am. Jur. 2d. Municipal Corporations§ 27 (county seat is principal city of the county 
where county officers perform their functions, county records are kept, and ordinarii y the 
principal county buildings including the county courthouse are located). 
The current Code of Iowa uses "county seat" as a legal designation for a variety of 
matters. See Iowa Code § 6B.46 (2014) (location for court of condemnation for condemnation 
1 In your letter requesting formal opinion on this issue you referenced informal advice previously provided by this 
office in 2013 expressing uncertainly as to the validity of a county ordinance that would alter the county seat 
designations in Lee County under its Home Rule powers. That informal advice is superseded by this formal 
opinion. 
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of existing utility); Iowa Code§ 62.10 (2014) (location for trial of contested election); Iowa 
Code§ 346.27 (2014) (allow county and its county seat to create an authority to construct joint 
buildings); Iowa Code§ 450.66 (2014) (location to appear before director of revenue under 
citation to locate inheritance tax property); Iowa Code § 455C.14 (2014) (location for beverage 
container redemption center); Iowa Code § 468.184 (2014) (place for hearing on reclassification 
of levee district lands); Iowa Code§§ 478.6, 479.8, and 479C.6 (2014) (location for 
condemnation hearing on utility improvements); Iowa Code§ 602.1303 (2014) (city supplies 
courtrooms for court held outside county seat); and Iowa Code § 602.8102(1) (2014) (clerk of 
court to keep office at county seat). 
Significantly, designation as the "county seat" triggers a duty for the county board of 
supervisors to provide offices to the recorder, treasurer, auditor, county attorney, county surveyor 
or engineer, county assessor and city assessor at the county seat. Iowa Code§ 331.322 (2014). 
Iowa Code section 331.322 is titled "Duties relating to county and township officers" and 
generally lists responsibilities of the board of supervisors to provide adequate resources for the 
other county officers to conduct their duties. When the board has not provided such office space 
at the county court house, this duty has been interpreted to require the board to compensate 
county officers for necessary office space elsewhere. 1970 Op. Atty. Gen. 607 (#70-4-37), 1970 
WL 207689. Iowa Code section 331.322(5) provides no requirement on the staffing of these 
offices, nor does it provide hours that county offices must be open. Contrast this to the pre-
county home rule provision, Iowa Code section 335.2 (1981), which required the recorder to 
keep an office at the county seat. 
While "county seat" continues to have legal significance post-home rule, the requirement 
that court be held at the county seat is no longer a mandatory requirement in all instances. See 
Iowa Code§ 602.6105(1) (2014) and Iowa Code § 331.381(16) (2014) (allowing a county with 
less than fifteen thousand residents to enter an agreement with a contiguous county to provide 
space for the district court); Iowa Code§ 602.1303(9) (2014) (county may elect not to maintain 
space for district court in the county by cost sharing with contiguous county and approval of the 
Supreme Court). Other provisions allow for court to be held at places in the county outside of 
the county seat. See Iowa Code§ 602.1303(1)(c) (2014) (city to provide court rooms when court 
is held in city not the county seat); Iowa Code§ 602.6105(2) (2014) (court in Pottawattamie 
County to be held at Avoca in addition to the county seat); Iowa Code § 602.6106 (2014) 
(providing all code provisions relating to district courts applicable when court not held in county 
seat). These authorities suggest that while holding district court in a city remains a 
characteristic of a "county seat", it is no longer an essential requirement to be a county seat, and 
a city could hold this status whether or not district court is held in the community. 
Location of County Seats 
A. Territorial and Early Statehood 
During territorial times and early statehood, county seats in Iowa were designated by 
special act of the legislature. See Act to divide Henry County, Statute Laws of the Territory of 
Iowa (151 Legislative Assembly Session, 1838-39), p. 97-99 (creating Jefferson County, and 
designating commissioners to fix the court seat), available October 1, 2014 at 




that era, the location of the county seats were commonly changed by special acts of the 
legislature that were requested by small groups with financial interests in relocation of the 
county seat, were passed without knowledge of the majority of county residents, caused 
disruption in county services, and expended valuable legislative resources. See Debates of the 
1857 Iowa Constitutional Convention, Vol. I, p. 532-535 available October 1, 2014 at 
http://publications.iowa.gov/7313/1/The Debates of the Constitutional Convention Vol%231. 
QQf. 
As a result of these concerns, the Revised Iowa Constitution of 1857 contains a provision 
that specifically bars local or special laws for "locating or changing county seats". Iowa 
Constitution, art. III, sec. 30. The General Assembly enacted general legislation to provide a 
statutory process to relocate county seats through a local election upon petition to the county 
government requesting to locate the county seat. Iowa Code §§ 231-39 (1860). This statutory 
county seat relocation process remained in a similar form until the implementation of the County 
Home Rule constitutional amendment. See Iowa Code chapter 353 - Relocation of County Seats 
(1981) (repealed 1981 Iowa Acts, 69th G.A., ch.117, § 1097). 
B. County Home Rule Era 
The current county powers chapter, Iowa Code Chapter 331-County Home Rule 
Implementation, contains no statutory provision for relocation of a county seat, or explicit 
limitation on the county ' s power to do so. This is consistent with the general grant to counties, 
under county home rule, to exercise powers the county deems appropriate in its local affairs 
when not inconsistent with state law. Iowa Constitution art. III, sec. 39A; Iowa Code § 
331.301(1) (2014). The County Home Rule Amendment, passed in 1978, followed the almost 
identical Municipal Home Rule Amendment, Article III, section 38A of the Iowa Constitution, 
passed in 1968. Because of the similarity of the city and county home rule provisions, courts use 
analysis interchangeably between these provisions. See Goodell v. Humboldt County, 575 
N.W.2d 486, 492 (Iowa 1998) (footnote 7). The powers under this enactment are vested in the 
board of supervisors, unless otherwise designated by code, and the repeal of a grant of power or 
failure to state a power by the legislature does not restrict home rule ·powers of a county. Iowa 
Code§ 331.301 (2014). The county board of supervisors exercises its powers under county 
home rule by ordinance, resolution or motion. Iowa Code § 331.302(1) (2014). 
Through these constitutional amendments, the voters of Iowa reset the scale by which county 
and city powers are measured in local affairs . Prior to passage of county and city home rule, a 
city or county could only act if it was granted a power to act under state law, or such act was 
necessarily implicated for a power expressly granted by state law. Worth County Friends of 
Agriculture v. Worth County, 688 N.W.2d 257, 265 (Iowa 2008) (footnote 7). After home rule, 
counties were empowered to act on local affairs unless state law forbade such action, or it was 
inconsistent with state law. !d., at 265. 
The legislature may preempt city or county home rule regulation by three methods: express 
preemption, implied field preemption, and implied conflict preemption. City of Davenport v. 
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Seymour, 755 N.W.2d 533, 538-39 (Iowa 2008); Goodell, at 492-93. Express preemption occurs 
where the legislature specifically prohibits regulation in an area. Goodell, at 492. Implied field 
preemption occurs where the legislature has enacted a comprehensive regulation in a field so as 
to reveal a clear intent by the state to occupy that field barring county or city regulation. 
Seymour, at 539. Implied conflict preemption occurs where a city or county action conflicts with 
state statutes. Goodell, at 493; Seymour, at 538-39. Exercise of a county power is not 
inconsistent with state law unless it is irreconcilable. Seymour, at 539. "Irreconcilable" conflict 
between state law and county action must be unresolvable short of choosing one enactment over 
the other. !d. The conflict must be obvious, unavoidable, and not a matter of reasonable debate. 
!d. The action of the county will be presumed to be valid and the conflicting state law should be 
interpreted to render it harmonious with the local action if possible. !d. 
After repeal of Iowa Code Chapter 353- Relocation of County Seats (1981), the Code is 
silent on the power or process of a county to relocate a county seat. Such a power would 
therefore, be the proper subject for county regulation under the County Home Rule unless such 
local action is in conflict with state statutory provisions and therefore subject to implied 
preemption. 
The Unique Case of Lee County 
Lee County, Iowa was established in 1836 by an act of the Wisconsin Territorial 
legislature which further provided that court in the newly-established county would be held in 
the city of Madison. 1837 Wisconsin Territorial Statutes, Act No. 21, Sections 1 and 8 (enacted 
December 7, 1836). Soon after Iowa statehood, the First Iowa General Assembly passed a 
special law providing that district court in Lee County was to be held in both Fort Madison and 
Keokuk. 1848 Acts, 1st G.A., extra session, ch. 52,§§ 1, 5, 6 (hereinafter "Special Law of 
1848"). This special law also required the clerk of court and sheriff maintain offices at both Fort 
Madison and Keokuk, that either the sheriff or a deputy reside at each city, and provided 
jurisdiction for each of the Lee County courts. !d. The act required the city of Keokuk to 
provide the facilities for holding court, but made no further provision of placement of other 
county offices. !d. Notably, the special law contained no language specifically designating a 
"county seat" or seats. Case law and other authorities have characterized Lee County as having 
two county seats, but none of these authorities indicate the Special Law of 1848 designated these 
two cities as county seats. See Froman v. Keokuk Health Systems, Inc., 755 N.W.2d 528 (Iowa 
1998); Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Liles, 430 N.W.2d 111, 111-12 (Iowa 
1988); State v. Turner, 114 Iowa 426, 87 N.W. 287 (Iowa 1901); 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. 341 (#75-
12-3). 
Can Lee County Unilaterally Eliminate a County Seat? 
While it is relatively clear that counties in Iowa may relocate the county seat under home 
rule powers (see discussion above) it is less clear that Lee County may eliminate one of its two 
county seats given the Special Law of 1848 requiring that district court be held in both Fort 
Madison and Keokuk, and that clerk of court and sheriff maintain offices in both cities. 1848 
Acts, 1st G.A., extra session, ch. 52,§§ 1, 5, 6. Such action would only be lawful if it is not 
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preempted by the Special Law of 1848 establishing the dual court in Lee County, and if it is not 
preempted by other statutory provisions. 
A. Special Law of 1848 
The relevant provisions of the 1848 Special Law creating the dual court system in Lee 
County follow: 
1. That district courts shall be held in the county of Lee at Fort Madison and at 
the city of Keokuk. 
2. That the city of Keokuk shall provide necessary rooms for holding court there 
free of charge. 
3. That the clerk of the district court will keep an office and perform all duties of 
the court at both Fort Madison and Keokuk by himself or by a deputy, one of 
whom shall reside at each city. 
4. That the sheriff will maintain offices and perform all duties to the district court 
at both Fort Madison and Keokuk by himself or a deputy, one of whom shall 
reside at each city. 
1848 Acts, 1st G.A., extra session, ch. 52, §§ 1, 5, 6. 
1. Express preemption 
There is no express language in the special act forbidding or otherwise limiting the power 
of Lee County to designate its county seat. !d. Therefore, Lee County is not expressly 
preempted from eliminating a county seat by this special law. ' 
2. Implied field preemption 
The special act does not specifically designate either city as a "county seat", nor does it 
mention this term at all. Special Law of 1848. The act makes no provision regarding location 
for offices of any of the other county officers or functions except for the sheriff. !d. Rather, the 
act is focused on the functions of the courts in Lee County. It could hardly be said that the 
legislature comprehensively covered the subject of the location of county seats in Lee County in 
this legislation so as to demonstrate a legislative intent that local action in the field is preempted 
by state law. 
3. Implied conflict preemption 
A. County action to close court functions 
The Seymour test for implied conflict preemption requires comparison of the proposed 
county action and the terms of the special act, to determine if the two are "irreconcilable" 
interpreting, if possible, the state law in such a manner as to render it harmonious with the 
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county action. Seymour, at 539. If Lee County by ordinance sought to close either district court 
or clerks of court offices at Fort Madison or Keokuk, or discontinue sheriff' s services to the 
district court at either, such ordinance would cause the kind of direct, irreconcilable conflict that 
would invalidate the county's action under implied preemption. 
B. County action to change county seat without closing court functions 
Conversely, if Lee County passed an ordinance merely ending the designation of one of 
these cities as a county seat, the ordinance would not cause a similar direct conflict with the 
Special Law of 1848. There are no provisions in that act purporting ,to designate either Keokuk 
or Fort Madison as a county seat, or to locate any county offices other than the district courts, 
clerks of court and sheriff. The General Assembly during this era commonly passed legislation 
directly addressing location of county seats, but failed to so designate in the Special Law of 
1848. Compare 1848 Acts, 1st G.A., extra session, chs. 48, 49, and 50 (requiring elections to be 
held to relocate county seats for Jackson, Clinton, and Davis Counties); 1846 Acts, Territorial 
G.A., ch. 47 (providing commission to relocate county seat of Keokuk County) with 1848 Acts, 
1st G.A., extra session, ch. 52, §§ 1, 5, 6 (requiring district court, clerk of court, and sheriff 
services in two cities, but not specifically designating county seat). The General Assembly 
certainly could have specifically designated both cities as county seats in the Special Law of 
1848, or required the other county offices to be located in each of these cities, but failed to do so. 
The Iowa Supreme Court's instruction in the Seymour case, to interpret legislation to render it 
harmonious with local actions, if possible, would support reading the Special Law of 1848 
narrowly to only require the district courts, clerks of court offices and sheriff's services to the 
court be provided in both Fort Madison and Keokuk and allowing the county to otherwise 
determine the location of the county seat, and where other services not mentioned in the Special 
Law would be provided. 
However, it may be argued that prior case law characterizing Lee County as having two 
county seats would prevent this narrow reading of the 1848 Special Law. These cases were not 
focused on the issue of whether the Special Law of 1848 created two county seats, the ability of 
Lee County to change county seat status, or where county offices are required to be located. See 
Froman v. Keokuk Health Systems, Inc., 755 N.W.2d 528,530 (Iowa 1998) (footnote stating Lee 
County is the only county having two county seats in a case determining proper venue for a Lee 
County civil case); Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Liles, 430 N.W.2d 111, 
111-12 (Iowa 1988) (dicta in disciplinary case involving assistant county attorney stating Lee 
County has two county seats in explaining allocation of duties that existed in the county 
attorney's office); State v. Turner, 114 Iowa 426, 87 N.W. 287 (Iowa 1901) (determining validity 
of a jury panel drawn by deputy recorder where recorder was absent conducting duties at the 
other county seat in Lee County). 
Several prior opinions of this office have repeated the characterization of Lee County as 
having two county seats in determining applicability of statutes fixing compensation for county 
officials serving counties with two county seats. 1976 Op. Att ' y Gen. 341 (#75-12-3), 1975 WL 
368858 (statute providing deputy officers of county with two county seats limited to salary up to 
75% of principal); 1940 Op. Att'y Gen. 280, 1939 WL 77220 (Pottawattamie County does not 
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have two county seats unlike Lee County, deputy officer is not entitled to higher maximum 
salary applicable in counties with two county seats); 1924 Op. Att'y Gen. 129, 1923 WL 54934 
(not allowing expenses to county officers for travel between the two county seats in Lee County). 
These opinions do not address the issue of Lee County 's power to designate the location or 
number of county seats. 
The narrow interpretation of the Special Law of 1848 is consistent with other legal 
requirements. Such reading would be in harmony with the prohibition of Article III, Section 30 
of the Iowa Constitution, barring legislative action to locate or change a county seat by special or 
local acts. See Santi v. Santi, 633 N.W.2d 312, 316 (Iowa 2001) (courts obliged to adopt 
construction of statute that upholds its constitutionality if susceptibl~ to multiple constructions). 
This construction also comports with the power enjoyed by counties since early statehood to 
locate their county seats under Iowa Code Chapter 353 - Relocation of County Seats (1981) 
(repealed 1981 Iowa Acts, 69th G.A., ch. 117, § 1097), and now under home rule powers. The 
narrow reading is consistent with evolving idea of "county seat" under Iowa law where location 
of the district court is not conclusive as to whether a city is or is not the "county seat". See 
discussion of "county seat" above page 3. 
Additionally, the narrow interpretation of the Special Law of 1848 is consistent with the 
construction given to a strikingly-similar statute that required an additional court to be held in 
Pottawattamie County. 1884 Acts, 20th G.A. , ch. 198. This legislation required district court to 
be held in Avoca in addition to the court held at the county seat, to maintain a clerk of court 
office at Avoca, to keep a sheriff's office in Avoca, for the city of Avoca to pay expenses for the 
court rooms, and dividing the county for jurisdiction and jury pools between these two courts. 
Id. This legislation was upheld against a claim it violated Article III, Section 30 of the Iowa 
Constitution as a special law locating a county seat. See Cooper v. Mills County, 69 Iowa 350, 
28 N.W. 633, 636 (1886). See also 1979 Op. Att'y Gen. 206 (# 79-6-9), 1979 WL 20985. This 
legislation has been described as creating two court houses, not two county seats. 1940 Op. 
Att'y Gen. 280, WL 77220 (Pottawattamie County has two court houses unlike Lee County 
which has two county seats) (recognized by 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. 341, 1975 WL 368858). But see 
True v. City of Council Bluffs, 230 Iowa 1109, 300 N.W. 264 (1941) (characterizing 
Pottawattamie County as having two county seats in unsuccessful venue dispute claiming 
Pottawattamie special act created two counties). This distinction is also reflected in statute. See 
Iowa Code§ 602.6105 (2014) (requiring court to be held in each county seat for counties having 
two county seats and in Pottawattamie County at Avoca and the county seat). 
Under this narrow reading of the Special Law of 1848 as only pertaining to establishment 
of district courts, clerks of court offices, and sheriff's services to the district courts at both Fort 
Madison and Keokuk, we find no irreconcilable inconsistency creating an implied preemption of 
county home rule powers if Lee County eliminated by ordinance one of these cities' designation 
as a "county seat" as long as this ordinance did not seek to discontinue these courts services in 
either city. Even without using a narrow reading of the 1848 Special Law, implied conflict 
preemption requires identification of some provision in that law that is in direct and 
irreconcilable conflict with a county action. An ordinance that would end county seat designation 
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for one of Lee County's two county seats without removing the services and offices required by 
the Special Law of 1848 would not create such a conflict. 
C. Inconsistency with other statutes 
Finally, we have been unable to find other statutes that would be-irreconcilably inconsistent 
with an ordinance revoking designation of one of the current county seat designations in Lee 
County. Iowa Code section 602.6105(2) (2014) requires district court to be held in both county 
seats for a county having two seats and Iowa Code § 602.8102(1) (2014) requires the clerk of 
court to keep an office at the county seat. This would not change the current status as the Special 
Law of 1848 would continue to require court to be held in both Keokuk and Fort Madison and to 
maintain a clerk of court office in each. Nor would there be an effeCt on current Iowa Code 
section 607 A.23, requiring counties "divided for judicial purposes" and in which court is held in 
more than one place, to be treated as separate counties requiring juries to be drawn and serve 
within each division. Lee County would continue to have court in both cities, and the Special 
Law of 1848 would continue to divide the county for court purposes. 
Conclusion 
Based on the foregoing analysis, it is our determination that Lee County could eliminate 
one of its current two county seats under its home rule powers. This is premised upon such 
action not seeking to close the district courts, clerks of court offices or discontinue the services 
of the Lee County sheriff to these courts in either Keokuk or Fort Madison. 
THOMAS J. MILLER 
MICHAEL BENNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
